Abstract
The event of a rising share price for a firm following the announcement of its intentions to acquire another firm is generally recognised as a sign of market support for the deal.
If the price continues to rise over the offer period, as the market fully digests various items of information related to the transaction, it can be interpreted that the market confidently expects the present value of synergies and other benefits to exceed the premium paid to acquire the target. In a transaction involving the exchange of a fixed number of shares in the acquiring firm as part or full consideration for the target, it seems often overlooked that a rising share price for the acquiring firm also impacts on the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. If the market overvalues expected synergies -or more specifically, if those structuring the deal set the share-exchange ratio at a level that underestimates the reaction of the market -it may be the case that the deal will destroy value for acquiring shareholders. We examine this issue within the context of a large corporate acquisition in Australia: the acquisition of Howard Smith Limited by Wesfarmers Limited.
Introduction
If the share price of a firm rises on the announcement of its intention to acquire another firm it is generally perceived to be a positive signal from the market of the logic of the proposed transaction, and the likelihood that the transaction will consummate. Notwithstanding that some portion of the rising price may be due to speculators hoping to realise a windfall gain over the offer period, the increase in price may also be interpreted as an initial reflection of the expected value to be created from the proposed combination of the two entities. In light of a significant body of evidence that suggests returns arising from acquisitions are negative -or at best, neutral -to shareholders in bidding firms, 1 a rising share price for a bidding firm should be a cause for celebration. Further, if shares in the bidding firm form part or all of the consideration for the target firm, the celebration associated with a rising share price should be intensified given the existence of a separate body of evidence that finds share-exchange acquisitions earn negative excess returns relative to matching stock while cash-based acquisitions earn positive excess returns relative to matching stock. 2 Given the large weight of evidence that stacks against the share price of an acquiring rising during the period from announcement to closure of the offer, a rising share price for a bidding firm is indeed a strong signal that the market expects the present value of synergies arising from the transaction to exceed any premium implicit in the offer. This signal is intensified when a share-exchange features in the structure of the offer. A surprisingly often-overlooked aspect of shareexchange acquisition is that a rising share price for the bidding firm also increases the premium paid for the target. This simple observation appears lost on some sharemarket investors, and even some investment bankers. In this sense, this paper represents a cautionary tale.
While a rising share price for the bidding firm in a share-exchange acquisition may appear to manifest as a win-win situation for both bidding and target shareholders -bidders gaining from a positive market assessment of the transaction and sellers gaining from an increase in the value of the offer for their stake -our years of working and teaching in finance have taught us to treat any claim of a 'win-win' situation with care (and a dose of scepticism).
Some commentators go so far as to claim that in a share-exchange acquisition the payment of a premium to target shareholders cannot be justified on the grounds that shareholders of both constituent firms remain shareholders in the post-acquisition entity and are thus able to 1 See Bruner (2004) for a detailed summary. 2 See Travlos (1987) , Fishman (1989) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) .
participate pro rata in any gains arising from the combination. 3 The fact that premiums are observed in share-exchange acquisitions, and that these premiums are not materially different from premiums in cash-acquisitions, leads these commentators to seek alternative explanations for the payment of premiums in share-exchange acquisitions (other than as a medium for sharing some proportion of acquisition gains with target shareholders in order to gain control of the target firm). Hamermesh (2003) , for example, finds that the existence of acquiring firm shareholder voting rights -in terms of shareholder approval for the acquisition -reduces merger premiums in share-exchanges by 18.65%. 4 According to this view, in order to ensure the support of acquiring shareholders, management must offer lower premiums.
This implies that if no such approval is required, there is no constraint on the size of acquisition premiums.
While there is no doubt a range of factors behind the decision of management to use shares in the bidding firm as part or full consideration for an acquisition -some of which we will review shortly -it is our position that premiums exist in share-exchange acquisitions for the same reason that they exist in cash-based acquisitions. Be it in the form of cash, shares or some other instrument, bidding firms must pay a premium to target shareholders in order to gain control of the target, and do so in the knowledge that some proportion of the expected gains from the transaction will be transferred to target shareholders. In this context it is erroneous to view a share-exchange acquisition as being materially different from a cashbased acquisition. In both mechanisms, there exists a buyer and a seller, and the value of the acquisition from the perspective of the buyer will depend on the extent to which there is a wealth transfer from buyer to seller that exceeds the value of the seller's assets in the hands of the buyer. Put simply, the value-creation principles that apply to a corporate acquisition should not differ from those that apply to the purchase of any asset.
This leads to the main focus of this paper. A key factor in the structure of a share-exchange acquisition is the predetermined exchange ratio, which represents the number of the acquirer's shares that are offered for each share of the target. The exchange ratio determines how the overall added value of an acquisition will be shared between shareholders of the acquiring company and the target company. If the exchange ratio is fixed, the value of a share-exchange offer will fluctuate with movements in the share price of the bidding firm. For example, if an exchange ratio in an offer is set and the acquirer's share price subsequently increases, then the net cost of the acquisition to acquiring company's shareholders also increases. This transfers a proportion of the gains from the acquisition from acquiring shareholders to shareholders in the target company. Conversely, a falling share price for the bidding firm will reduce the value of the consideration paid to shareholders of the target firm, and reduce the probability that the deal will be supported by target shareholders over the offer period.
In general, an increase in the acquirer's share price will occur on the announcement of a takeover bid to the extent that the market believes synergies and other benefits arising from control will be realised in the acquisition. Specifically, for value to be created for the shareholders of the bidding firm, the present value of expected synergies and other control benefits, net of integration and transaction costs, must exceed the premium paid for control of the target firm. Price fluctuations will also be influenced by the view of the market as to the probability of the offer being accepted at the minimum threshold. These complications need to be considered by the acquiring company when setting the exchange ratio for the offer. In this regard, the bidding firm needs to assess how its share price is likely to change during the period between the announcement of the offer and the anticipated closing date of the offer, which with extensions, may last up to many weeks. Deal makers must assess not only market reactions to the proposed transaction -which may fluctuate contingent upon release of independent expert reports and other information over the period -but also, factors unrelated to the deal which may influence the share price of the bidding firm. These could be firmspecific factors related to other aspects of the firm's operations, or general market-wide factors.
It is our observation that most of the literature related to risk in the form of payment in acquisitions tends to focus on the adverse consequences of the share price of the bidding firm falling either over the offer period or post acquisition. A price decline may result if the market doubts the realisation of synergies or if it interprets an equity exchange as a signal from management that the bidding firm is overvalued. If shareholders in the target firm fear that the share price of the bidding firm will fall over the offer period -and they believe they should share in any value that their stake creates for bidding shareholders -they may be less likely to accept the offer. Similarly, target shareholders may fear that management in the bidding firm have been overzealous in their estimation of the amount or timing of expected synergies, and that the share price of the bidding firm will fall post-acquisition as the market subsequently recasts its expectations on the value of the new entity.
In this paper we focus on the risk that over the offer period the share price of the bidding firm overshoots the expectations of those structuring the deal. This may arise if the market overvalues the expected gains from the transaction. This phenomenon may have largely escaped the vision of commentators seduced by perceptions of the 'win-win' situation under rising share prices for bidding firms. As argued earlier, we consider this win-win view to be misguided. Although significantly more complex, an acquisition should not be viewed separately from any other asset purchase. What distinguishes a share-exchange offer from a cash offer is that under the former, the net present value of the acquisition will be influenced by subsequent share price movements over the offer period. If the target receives a consideration in excess of the intrinsic value of the acquisition to the acquirer, then the acquirer has overpaid and the transaction is value-destroying from the perspective of the bidding firm. An alternative way to view this is in terms of an opportunity loss to the bidding firm. If management in the bidding firm genuinely expected its market price to overshoot the value associated with expected synergies in the deal, it could have offered a cash price for the target and financed the transaction by issuing equity in the market at the overvalued price.
The surplus cash raised could subsequently be used for other purposes within the entity.
Alternatively, management could have set a lower share-exchange ratio in the structure of the offer.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we examine various factors share-exchange ratio in the transaction. This substantial increase in price was heralded by investment bankers and analysts as market support for the transaction and evidence that the acquisition demonstrated the creation of significant shareholder value. 5 We offer a counter view. Based on a discounted cash flow analysis of the transaction, using data published at the time on expected synergies and integration costs, we find that the rising share price of the bidding firm resulted in a significant transfer of value from shareholders in the acquiring firm to shareholders in the target firm, such that the deal was net present value negative to the shareholders of the acquiring firm. While our analysis has been conducted without specific inside information on the part of either the bidding or target firm, the analysis, at the very least, serves as a reminder that rising share prices on the part of the bidding firm represent a very real transaction risk in fixed share-exchange acquisitions.
Factors Influencing the Form of Consideration in Acquisitions
In keeping with Miller and Modigliani (1958) , the form of consideration in a corporate acquisition should have no influence on the value of the transaction when capital markets are perfect. It thus should come as no surprise that the literature which focuses on factors driving the form of consideration centres on market imperfections such as information asymmetries, taxation, managerial stakes in bidding and target firms, and the share price performance of the bidding firm over a specific period leading up to an offer announcement. In this section we briefly review some of the major findings of this literature.
Hansen (1987) argues that the risk of overpayment is higher in a cash bid than in a share exchange because in a cash bid the bidding firm assumes the full risk that synergies turn out to be lower than expected. In a share exchange, this risk is shared with the shareholders of the target firm. For this reason, a cash bid may be seen by the market as a positive sign of the confidence of management of the bidding firm of the realisation of synergies and other benefits. Travlos (1987) finds the share-exchanges as a means of payment typically result in significant losses to shareholders of bidding firms, based on the hypothesis that given the choice between a cash offer and a share offer, the latter delivers negative information regarding the value of the assets of bidding companies. This is the so-called signalling hypothesis associated with equity issues. In a similar vein, Fishman (1989) finds that cash offers convey positive information regarding the valuation of the assets of the bidder. Loughran and Vijh (1997) review 947 deals and compare post-acquisition returns of companies to the returns on matching stock chosen to control for size and market to book value effects. They find that share-exchange acquisitions earn negative excess returns relative to matching stock returns (-24%) while the returns on cash offer acquisitions outperform matching stock (19%). The fact that most empirical studies find that share-exchange offers result in declining share prices in bidding firm provides one explanation as to why market commentators appear less focused on the potential negative impact that arises when share prices for the bidding firm rise over the offer period. If the overriding evidence is that share prices in bidding firms fall on announcement of share-exchange acquisitions, it is probable that this will feature heavily in their risk assessment of the transaction. It is easy to forget, however, that while a falling share price may mean the transaction is less likely to be accepted by target shareholders when bidding firm shares feature in the consideration, conversely, the value of the potential acquisition will be rising to the acquiring shareholders.
Taxation issues related to the form of consideration tend to centre on the potential liability for capital gains tax for shareholders in target firms who accept their consideration in cash. If capital gains tax rollover relief applies, shareholders in the target firm who accept their consideration in shares in the bidding firm are not required to pay tax on any capital gains they may realise in the transaction until disposal of the shares. Thus, all else equal, a cash offer could bring about higher premiums relative to a share exchange if the bidding firm deems that the offer will not be accepted unless target shareholders are compensated for the more immediate tax burden arising in a cash offer. Stulz (1988) finds that share exchanges are used less in transactions where the ownership stake of management in bidding firms is larger. Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) On a pre-goodwill basis, it was estimated that the earnings per share of Wesfarmers would increase from $1.18 pre-deal to $1.25 for the full-year 2002, based on a 1 July acquisition date.
Value of Target in the Offer
The structure of the offer was $12.00 cash and two Wesfarmers shares for every five Howard In the next subsection we conduct a financial analysis of the transaction.
Financial Analysis
Our analysis of the transaction involves a four-step process. First, using discounted cash flow analysis of our estimates of the free cash flows accruing to equity investors, we value both the bidding firm and target firm prior to the announcement of the offer. We then use the same approach to value the target under control of the management of bidding firm, but prior to the businesses combining. We then value the combined entity prior to the realisation of synergies.
Finally we value the combined entity with expected synergies in place. The basis for each step is described in the following paragraphs. Supporting data is presented in Table 1 .
Value each company prior to the announcement of the takeover offer
The objective of this step is value each entity -buyer and seller -under its existing investment, capital structure and dividend policies in order to provide a base to estimate control value and synergy value, where the former arises from improved management of the existing business and the latter arises from the combination of the assets and operations of the two entities.
Wishing to remove any bias from our analysis, and to eliminate noise, we valued both firms at their actual close of business prices on the 12 June 2001 (their pre-announcement market capitalisations). This enabled us to assess key financial and operational drivers, as implied by actual share prices immediately prior to the takeover offer. The results are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 .
Estimate the value of control in the target
In this step we value Howard Smith under the assumption that it is managed by Wesfarmers but prior to the firms combining. The incremental increase in value in the target firm represents the value of control to Wesfarmers. We deliberately exclude synergies from this step in order to isolate any incremental impact arising from supposed superior management of the target firm.
Wesfarmers advised that it could substantially improve the operating performance of BBC Hardware by 'utilising its management expertise and operating approach'. As noted by market analysts, Bunnings had achieved a significantly better performance record than Value combined entity before synergies but with target under optimal management
In this step we combine the free cash flow projections of Wesfarmers pre-acquisition and
Howard Smith under optimal control. This step provides two main advantages. First, it allows us to derive key operational and financial drivers arising from the combination of the entities, which in turn gives a basis for incorporating expected synergies arising from the combination.
Second, we can use the combined free cash figures and asset valuation figure to calculate the internal rate of return on the combined entity before synergies. We use this figure as the basis of for the discount rate of the combined entity when synergies are incorporated in the cash flows estimates. The results are presented in Column 5 of Table 1 .
Value the combined entity with synergies and optimal control of target
The forecast synergies of $40 million per year (later revised to $60 million) were reported to arise from operating gains in store administration, merchandising and advertising, and overhead synergies in information technology, administration, store development and corporate services. More specifically:
• The amalgamation of merchandising teams and improved terms with suppliers which will reduce costs and increase gross margins The results are presented in Column 6 of Table 1 . These changes result in a change in value of the combined firm of $662 million.
Assessments
Our 
CONCLUSION
Share exchanges are becoming increasingly common as a form of consideration in corporate acquisitions. Under a fixed share-exchange ratio the value of acquisition to shareholders in the bidding firm varies as the share price of the bidding firm changes over the course of the offer period. In this regard, the focus of much of the literature on transaction risk in acquisitions is directed to the adverse consequences of a falling share price for the bidding firm. This focus may be stimulated by the empirical observation that the share prices of bidding firms, more often than not, tend to fall on announcement of share-financed acquisitions. Falling share prices reduce the value of the transaction to target shareholders, and as such, reduce the likelihood that the offer will be accepted in the absence of any offsetting increase in the consideration.
When share prices of bidding firms rise over the offer period, this may be viewed as a positive reaction to the transaction. Specifically, rising prices suggest that the present value of synergies and other benefits, net of integration and transaction costs, is expected to exceed the premium offered in the transaction. It seems overlooked by some commentators, however, that rising share prices on the part of the bidding firm also act to reduce any surplus on the deal that may be accruing to bidding shareholders. If the market overestimates the value of synergies in the transaction, it is possible that the transaction will destroy value for bidding shareholders in the sense that the payment for the target firm exceeds the value of the benefits arising from the integration of the businesses. In this paper we examined the impact of a positive market reaction to an acquisition within the context of a large deal in Australia -the acquisition of Howard Smith Limited by Wesfarmers Limited. Using publicly available information on the transaction -released over the time of the offer -and conservative assumptions, we estimate the deal destroyed value for Wesfarmers shareholders. 
